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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

14517

WILLIAM W. MORRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by a packaging manufacturer to recover on
a personal guaranty allegedly executed by Defendant Morris (Morris )
on behalf of a now defunct corporation.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded Plaintiff Packaging Corporation of America
("PCA") judgment in the amount of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00)
together with court costs of Twenty Eight Dollars ($28.00) and attorney's fees of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the lower courtfs
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant William Morris was a shareholder of Hawkeye Investment Company ("Hawkeye Investment11) , a Nevada corporation.

Early

in 1971, Hawkeye Investment purchased the assets of Bakker's Royal
Dutch Cookies in Utah through a court-appointed receivership.

The

corporation leased the premises and operated the cookie plant at
Draper, Utah.

(Trial Record /hereinafter cited as "R.f7 at 2-3).

At about the same time, Hawkeye Investment began dealing with PCA
who agreed to supply Hawkeye Investment with cookie cartons for
its product.

Since the business was new and experiencing cash flow

problems, PCA at first refused to extend credit to Hawkeye Investme
and all orders were shipped C.O.D. (R. 49, 59-60).
In early 1971, Morris and William Birkinshaw ("Birkinshaw"), th
President of Hawkeye Investment, approached the credit manager of
PCA to see if there was a possibility that Hawkeye Investment coulc
get an open account with PCA.

PCA's area credit manager agreed to

open an account if the account were personally guaranteed by an
individual with an interest in Hawkeye Investment. (R. at 6).

Bott

Morris and Birkinshaw signed, as co-guarantors, a personal guaranty
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for Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) at that time.

(R. at 67).

Once the account was opened, PCA extended credit to Hawkeye
Investment over and above the limits of the $10,000.00 personal
guaranty without notice to Morris.

(R. at 36-37).

By January 31,

1972, PCA's area credit manager estimated that PCA had extended
credit to Hawkeye Investment amounting to approximately $22,000.00
or $23,000.00.

(R. at 33).

In February, 1972, PCA approached

Morris for an extended personal guaranty to cover this excess credit.
(R. at 8, 18). At no time was Morris ever informed that the outstanding indebtedness was already well above the $20,000.00 level.
(R. at 36-37, 86-87).

After some negotiation, PCA prepared a

$20,000.00 guaranty form with specifically designated signature
lines for both Birkinshaw and Morris.

(R. at 12, 17). The form

was first sent to Morris who signed it on the understanding that
Birkinshaw would also sign, and that his agreement was predicated
on Birkinshawfs action.

(R. at 84-85).

The form was then returned

to PCA which failed to obtain Birkinshawfs signature (R. at 12, 17).
Morris is not a resident of Utah.

His discussions with PCA

personnel were nearly all conducted through long distance telephone
from Nevada where he resides.

He was in the state of Utah only twice

in each of the two years from 1971 to 1972. These visits related to
his business interests within the state; they did not concern the
personal guaranties Morris had signed.
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(R. at 88-89)•

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT IS INVALID BECAUSE THE COURT
LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT.
In holding that it had personal jurisdiction over Morris, the
lower court ignored a long line of cases from this Court holding
that there can be no long-arm jurisdiction asserted unless the
defendant's contacts with the forum state relate directly to the
transaction from which the claim allegedly arose.
The Utah Long Arm Statute, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Sections 7827-22, et seq., has been construed several times by the Utah
Supreme Court.

Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction over Defendant Morris

under its statutory provisions which state:
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an
agent does any of the following . . . acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising; from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this
state . . . .
/Emphasis added/
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-27-24 (1953).
But Plaintiff's reliance is misplaced.

Implicit in the statute

are the "fundamental notions of due process" announced by the Unite*
States Supreme Court in the landmark decision International Shoe Co
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945):
/I/n order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the
-A-

territory of the forum, he /must/ have
certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.1 /Emphasis
added/
The essential minimum contacts required by the Utah Long Arm Statute,
as it has been interpreted by this Court are lacking in this case,
Morris1 meeting in Draper, Utah during 1971, his two visits to Utah
during 1971 and his two visits during 1972 were not related to the
personal guaranty.

Morris was simply overseeing his business in-

terests in the state.

Therefore, the lower court did not have in

personam jurisdiction over Defendant under any of the statutefs
provisions.
This Courtfs recent decision in Mack Finanacial Corp. v. Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429 (Utah, 1974) illustrates a critical
aspect of Section 24 which
looked.

Plaintiff seems to have entirely over-

In that case, the defendant Nevada corporation entered into

a contract to purchase trucks from the plaintiff, who maintained a
business office in Utah.

The contracts were entirely negotiated in

Colorado and signed in Denver.

Defendant drove the trucks to Utah

and at one point sent an agent to Salt Lake City to obtain permission to assign the purchase contracts for the trucks to a third
party.

When the assignee failed to make payments the plaintiff in-

stituted suit against the Nevada defendant, alleging that the acts
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of the defendant in Utah satisfied the minimum contacts requirement
for purposes of a suit on the purchase price.

Noting that the act

of driving in the state would give Utah courts jurisdiction of case*
arising from injuries arising from such driving, the Court reversed
the lower court and held that the contacts of defendant in Utah wer<
not sufficient to establish a business presence for purposes of the
suit on the purchase price.
It seems clear that a suit questioning the validity of the assignment in the Mack Financial case as well as one involving a true!
accident would have been properly maintainable in Utah.

But the

Court, without specifically citing it, applied the explicit provisL
of Section 24 that jurisdiction is invoked only "as to any claim
arising from11 the enumerated acts.

It does not matter that a defen

dant may have had extensive contacts with the state of Utah wholly
irrelevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.

If the acts from

which the claim arose do not have one of the statutory nexes with t
state of Utah, there is no basis for the extension of jurisdiction
to a non-resident defendant.
In several recent decisions construing Section 24, this Court
has held that non-resident defendants with even greater contacts
connected with the respective plaintiff's causes of action were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts.

In Transwestern

General Agency v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah, 1974), the defendant
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through his insurance agent, initiated contact with a Utah insurance
agency to obtain liability insurance.

This single contact was held

insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction in the insurance
company's suit to recover an earned premium on the policy.

In the

instant case, the initial contact in negotiating the guaranty document was made by Plaintiff in the state of Nevada, and there was no
connection with the state of Utah with respect to the guaranty itself.
In

Kocha v. Gobson Products Co., 525 P.2d 580 (Utah, 1975), the

defendant manufactured wire merchandise racks, one of which arrived
through the stream of commerce in Utah and injured the plaintiff.
The Court held that no sufficient connection with Utah causing the
injury had been shown.
In Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., 27 Utah 2d
233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972), plaintiff sued to recover the purchase
price of boats sold from Utah to an Oregon defendant on a theory that
by failing to pay the price defendant had converted the boats, causing
injury to plaintiff in Utah.

The Court rejected the argument as

insufficient to meet the minimum contracts requirement of the due
process clause.
Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959), was decided before the enactment of Section 24, but involved an identical
Illinois statute.

In that case, this Court gave three factors sup-

porting its decision that an Illinois extension of jurisdiction was
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invalid: (1) the out-of-state buyer (a Utah buyer outside of
Illinois) had not taken the initiative; (2) the contract was
consummated outside of Illinois; and (3) no damage was done to
the citizens of Illinois by the defendant's failure to make payment
to the plaintiff.

In the instant case, the contract was consum-

mated in the state of Nevada, and no injury has been done to any
citizen of Utah by any action of Defendant Morris.
None of the acts alleged by Plaintiff establish any nexus whatever between the negotiations concerning the signing of the document from which this claim arose. Morris1 four visits to the state
of Utah during 1971 and 1972 were not made in connection with the
$20,000.00 guaranty.

It was undisputed at trial that Morris came

into the state on those occasions to look after business interests
separate from the guaranty. (R. at 88-89).

The alleged acts were

therefore, as a matter of law, insufficient to confer jurisdiction
on the lower court with respect to the claim before it.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUARANTY WAS
COMPLETE AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE AGAINST MORRIS.
Though the matter has naturally not been the subject of frequer
litigation in Utah, it is well settled law that a guaranty contain!
the conditional signature of one proposed guarantor, subject to the
additional signature of another party, is not valid without the
subsequent signature of the other party.

This Court recognized thi

principle in State Bank v. Burton-Gardner Co,. 14 Utah 420, 423,
48 P.402, 403 (1897):
Undoubtedly the law is that one or more
persons may sign a note or guaranty, and
deliver it to the payee with the agreement that they shall not be bound unless
other persons named shall sign also; and,
if such other persons do not sign, that
those signing shall not be held.
As the Court in Wall v. Eccles, 61 Utah 247, 252, 211 p. 702, 704
(1922) noted, the issue "presents a mixed question of law and fact".
There is yet another rule that applies to this issue in the case
at bar.

The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental

rule that vague, ambiguous, or uncertain terms in a contract should
be strictly construed against the documentfs framer.

General

Appliance Corp. v. Haw. I n c . 30 Utah 2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 (1973);
Seal v. Tavco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965); See
Financial Corp. v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon Co.. 29 Utah 2d 238,
507 P.2d 1026 (1973).
In Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 233, 500 P.2d 503 (1965),
this Court applied the principle to find the plaintiff liable on
defendant!s counterclaim despite ambiguous language in the contract
which purportedly exculpated plaintiff from liability for special
or consequential damages.

The Court stated:

/I/n cases of uncertainty as to the meaning
of the contract, it should be construed most
strictly against its framer . . . . /I/t seems
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manifestly unfair to permit one who
formulates a contract to so fashion
it as to mislead the other party by
setting forth a clearly apparent
promise or representation in order
to induce acceptance, and then designedly burying elsewhere in the document
. . . provisions which proport to limit
or take away the promise and/or preclude
recovery for failure to fulfill it.
Id. at 326,400 P.2d at 505.
This Court recognized the principle would also apply to ambiguous terms contained in a personal guaranty in General Appliance
Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 (1973).

That case

involved shareholders who withdrew from an unprofitable carpet retailing corporation which had incurred debts to plaintiff. The
shareholders formed a new corporation, to carry on the business.
Since plaintiff refused to deal with them otherwise, the shareholders executed a personal guaranty making them "responsible for
the payment of the purchase price of . . . merchandise . . . sold
or delivered11 to the new corporation.

When plaintiff brought suit

to hold the shareholders liable for debts of the first corporation
which had been assumed by the new corporation, this Court denied
recovery, stating:
The guaranties were drawn by plaintiff, and
if there were any uncertainty or ambiguity
as to the meaning of the terms of the contract, it would be construed strictly against
the framer.
-10-

Id., at 241, 516 P.2d at 347-48.

But the Court went on to find that

there was no ambiguity because the term "sale11 clearly did not include
prior debts assumed by the new corporation.
Finally, the Court impliedly recognized that the

principle

could have applicability in a case similar to the one at bar, Financial Corp. v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon Co.%29 Utah 2d 238, 507 P.2d
1026 (1973).

In that case plaintiff sued defendants to recover on a

personal guaranty allegedly executed by defendants on behalf of their
corporation.

One defendant argued that he was not bound by the

guaranty because he had signed it solely in reliance upon plaintiff's
false representation that the other defendant had already signed.
The Court rejected this defense only because the other defendant was
estopped to deny his signature on the guaranty.
The case at bar is an instance where the rule should apply.
Plaintiff prepared the $20,000.00 guaranty with two signature lines
designated for Morris and Birkinshaw.

Morris was thus led to believe

that this guaranty, like the $10,000.00 guaranty executed earlier,
was to be a joint and conditional guaranty, enforceable only if
Birkinshaw also signed.

But the Plaintiff did not even ask Birkinshaw

to sign

the document and now seeks to recover the entire amount from

Morris.

It is submitted that the Court should apply the rule recog-

nized in the above cases and it should construe the terms of the
guaranty contract, including its misleading signature designations,
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strictly against the Plaintiff, its framer.

As the Court noted in

Seal v, Tayco, Inc., supra, Plaintiff should not be permitted to bei
fit from the uncertainty and ambiguity it created in drafting the c<
tract.

It is submitted that this Court should support the intent o

the parties and find that the contract was a joint and conditional
guaranty, not enforceable against Morris alone.
POINT III
THE GUARANTY IS UNENFORCEABLE FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
It has long been recognized that a guaranty is not enforceable
unless it is supported by consideration.
be in the form
creditor.

Such consideration may

of a benefit to the guarantor or a detriment to the

In Armstrong v. Cache Valley Land & Canal Co., 14 Utah

450, 48 P.690 (1897), this Court held that a personal guaranty for
defendants1 note was not enforceable because defendants had given
bonds and securities as collateral for the note, and the guaranty
was not supported by any other consideration.

In essence, the Cour

reasoned, defendants derived no benefit from the guaranty.
Consideration may also come in the form of assurances and inducements made prior to execution of the principal contract.

But

where the plaintiff enters into a contract without any expectation
or assurances that it will be personally guaranteed, courts general
have held the guaranty unenforceable for lack of consideration.

Fc

example, in Northern State Construct. Co. v. Robbins., 457 P.2d 187
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(Wash. 1969), the Supreme Court of Washington held that since the
guaranty was dated after the principal construction and there was
no indication that a guaranty was expected, the guaranty was without
consideration and unenforceable.

See Gelco IVM Leasing Co. v. Alger,

6 Wash. App. 519, 494 P.2d 501 (1972).

(Guaranty held unenforceable

for lack of consideration where principle five-year lease contract
was entered into prior to guaranty without indications that guaranty
was expected).
In the case at bar, Defendant Morris likewise received no benefit
from executing the personal guaranty.

Late in 1971, before the

$20,000.00 guaranty was executed, PCA had extended over $20,000.00 in
credit to Hawkeye International, well beyond the $10,000.00 amount
covered by the first guaranty.

It was not until early in 1972 that

Plaintifff PCA finally asked Defendants to execute a second guaranty
for $20,000.00.

Prior to that time Defendant had made no assurances,

nor had PCA requested any.

Since Defendant received no benefit and

Plaintiff incurred no detriment for the $20,000.00 guaranty, it is not
supported by consideration and therefore, unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court against Defendant Morris should
be reversed.

The lower court did not have personal jurisdiction

over Morris to render judgment.

Moreover, the guaranty is unenforceable
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because of its conditional nature and because it was not supported
by consideration.
Respectfully submitted,

Paul T. Moxley
/
/
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN
'
/
1320 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Certificate of Service
The foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant William W. Morris
was served upon Plaintiff-Respondent Packaging Corporation of
America by mailing, postage prepaid, two copies to its attorney,
Lauren N. Beasley, of Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Beasley, at
430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this
of

V O A ^

, 1976.
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Paul T. Moxley
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